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Many predictions and conclusions in the climate change literature have been made and 
drawn on the basis of theoretical analyses and quantitative models that assume 
exogenous technological change. One is naturally led to wonder whether those 
conclusions and policy prescriptions hold in the more realistic case of endogenously 
evolving technologies. In previous work we took a popular integrated assessment model 
and modified it so as to allow for an explicit role of the stock of knowledge which 
accumulates through R&D investment. In our formulation knowledge affects both the 
output production technology and the emission-output ratio. In this paper we make 
further progress in our efforts aimed to model the process of technological change. In 
keeping with recent theories of endogenous growth, we specify two ways in which 
knowledge accumulates: via a deliberate, optimally selected R&D decision or via 
experience, giving rise to Learning by Doing. As an illustration, we simulate the model 
under the two versions of endogenous technical change and look at the dynamics of a 
selected number of relevant variables, including growth rates of GDP and physical 
capital, as well as total emissions and rate of domestic abatement. 
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LEARNING BY DOING vs LEARNING BY RESEARCHING 
IN A MODEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
That current rates of greenhouse gas emissions cannot be sustained in the long 
run is by now an undisputed fact. Current production modes, with their associated levels 
of fossil fuel consumption, cannot proceed at present rates. 
No one really believes or is ready to accept, however, that the solution of the 
climate change problem consists of reducing the pace of economic growth. Instead, it is 
believed that changes in technology will bring about the longed decoupling of economic 
growth from generation of polluting emissions. There is a difference in attitude in this 
respect, though. Some maintain a faithful view that technological change, having a life 
of its own, will automatically solve the problem. Others express the conviction that the 
process of technological change by and large responds to impulses and incentives, and it 
has therefore to be fostered by appropriate policy actions. 
The above remarks are reflected in climate models, the main quantitative tools 
designed either to depict long run energy and pollution scenarios or to assist in climate 
change policy analysis. Indeed, these models have traditionally accounted for the 
presence of technical change, albeit usually evolving in an exogenous fashion. More 
recently, models have been proposed where the technology changes endogenously 
and/or its change is induced by deliberate choices of agents and government 
intervention. 
Both bottom-up and top-down models, a long standing distinction in energy-
economy-environment modeling, have been recently modified in order to accommodate 
forms of endogenous technical change. As it turns out, the bottom-up approach has 
mostly experimented with the notion of Learning by Doing (LbD henceforth), while a 
few top-down models have entertained the notion of a stock of knowledge which 
accumulates over time via R&D spending. No model designed for climate change 
policy analysis has however yet been proposed that incorporates both approaches in a 
single conceptual framework. This is what the model presented here does. 
In previous work we presented a model in which both endogenous and induced 
technical change were taken into account (Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo, and  3
Galeotti, 2000, 2001; Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti, 2001).
1 In particular, it was 
assumed that R&D investment accumulates into a stock of knowledge that affects both 
the production technology (endogenous technical change) and the emission-output ratio 
(induced technical change). Extending Nordhaus and Yang (1996)’s RICE model we 
assumed that the stock of knowledge enters the production function as one of the 
production factors and, at the same time, affects the emission-output ratio, as originally 
proposed by Goulder and Mathai (2000) (see also Nordhaus, 2002).
2 Thus, the idea is 
that more knowledge will help firms increase their productivity and reduce their 
negative impact on the environment. In this modified version, the central planner in 
each country chooses the optimal R&D effort that, in turn, increases the stock of 
technological knowledge. The amount of R&D is therefore a policy variable envisaged 
by the model. 
Using that model, which we labeled “ETC-RICE”, the policy game played by 
the six regions in which the world is divided was solved. Each region chooses the 
optimal level of four instruments: fixed investments, R&D expenditures, rate of 
emission control, and the amount of permits which each country wants to buy or sell. In 
addition, the model was modified in order to allow for emission trading, which was then 
studied both amongst Annex B countries only and amongst all countries under the 
Kyoto Protocol. We considered two versions of the model: in the first one, with 
endogenous technical change, the choice of the optimal amount of R&D does not affect 
the emission-output ratio; in the second one, with induced technical change (i.e. 
endogenous environmental technical change), a change in the stock of knowledge also 
modifies the emission-output ratio. This therefore depends on the optimal R&D chosen 
by each country, which is in turn dependent on relative prices and hence also on climate 
policies.
3 
                                                           
1 See also Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo (2002), Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002), 
and Castelnuovo, Moretto and Vergalli (2001). 
2 A more recent version of the RICE model is currently available (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). Among 
other aspects, the world is divided in eight regions (six before) and a new production input called carbon 
energy has been introduced, together with a revised treatment of energy supply which is no longer seen as 
inexhaustible. Technical change still evolves exogenously. We started our research on endogenous and 
induced technical change before this new version of the RICE model was available. This is the reason 
why LbD is incorporated in the old version of RICE. We are in the process of making the transition to the 
new version, for which some preliminary and provisional results are available  (Castelnuovo and Galeotti, 
2002). 
3 International spillovers of knowledge were also introduced in a version of the ETC-RICE model, with 
the stock of world knowledge affecting both production and emission technologies.  4
In this paper we take the same model but extend it so as to allow for an 
alternative source of technical change, Learning by Doing. In particular, we use 
arguments originally made by Arrow (1962) in supposing that the accumulation of 
knowledge occurs not as a result of deliberate (R&D) efforts, but as a side effect of 
conventional economic activity. LbD has been introduced in climate models first in the 
bottom-up approach by Anderson and Bird (1992) and Messner (1995, 1997). Central in 
these dynamic energy simulation models is the notion of “learning curve”, which 
reflects the observation that with greater “experience” (cumulative production), there is 
a pronounced tendency for a decline in the unit costs of novel technologies (such as 
photovoltaics and wind power), but there is no obvious decline in the unit costs of more 
conventional methods (such as supercritical coal and natural gas – combined cycle). The 
newer technologies tend to be higher in unit costs than the conventional ones. If 
investors base all their decisions on immediate costs, there would be little tendency to 
support the newer technologies that are currently more expensive. Their cumulative 
experience is too small, and they could be “locked out” permanently. This is the 
rationale for public intervention in the market. Leaning-by-doing entails the acceptance 
of high near-term costs in return for an expected lowering of future costs. 
In our further extension of the RICE model, we follow Romer (1996) in 
modeling LdB in the simplest way, that is by assuming that learning occurs as a side 
effect of the accumulation of new physical capital. This entails a production function 
which exhibits increasing returns to capital. In order to maintain the analogy with the 
R&D-based version of the model we also allow for the emission-output ratio to depend 
upon cumulated capacity, i.e. the sum of past physical investment efforts. It should be 
apparent that these model specifications make explicit reference to the recently 
developed theory of endogenous growth which emphasizes the role of knowledge, of 
physical and human capital, R&D activities, and LbD. 
The paper begins in Section 2 with a brief review of the literature on endogenous 
environmental technical change in order to set the scene for our specific modeling 
proposal. In Section 3, the model is presented, starting from the basic version and 
leading up to our two alternative formulations. In the section we also describe how the 
model accounts for international emission trading and our parameter calibration choices. 
In order to quantify the effects of introducing induced technical change either via R&D 
or via LBD, Section 4 presents results of some illustrative simulation runs under 
alternative environmental policy scenarios, coherent with the implementation of the  5
Kyoto Protocol.
4 First, the impact of imposing an emission target without allowing for 
trade is studied. Then, emission trading is considered, with exchange taking place 
amongst Annex B countries. A few final remarks together with directions for further 
research close the paper. 
 
 
2.  On Environmental Endogenous Technical Change Modeling 
While there is little debate over the importance of energy efficiency in limiting 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, there is intense debate about its cost-effectiveness 
and about the government policies that should be pursued to enhance energy efficiency. 
Analysts have pointed out for years that there is an “energy efficiency gap” between the 
most energy-efficient technologies available at some point in time and those that are 
actually in use. On this basis, debate has centred upon the extent to which there are low-
cost or no-cost options for reducing fossil energy use through improved energy 
efficiency. Jaffee, Newell, and Stavins (1999) note that this debate opposes 
“technologists” and economists, who hold very different views about the issue. 
“Technologists” believe that there are plentiful opportunities for low-cost 
improvements in energy efficiency, and that realizing these opportunities will require 
active intervention in markets for energy-using equipment to help overcome barriers to 
the use of more efficient technologies. This view implies that with the appropriate 
technology and market creation policies, significant GHG reduction can be achieved at 
very low cost. In essence, the approach is restricted to constraining energy-efficiency 
decisions with the goal of overcoming the existing “market barriers” to the penetration 
of various technologies that enhance energy efficiency. 
To “Economists” only some of these barriers represent real “market failures” 
that reduce economic efficiency. This view emphasizes that there are tradeoffs between 
economic efficiency and energy efficiency: it is possible to get more of the latter, but 
typically only at the cost of less of the former. The economic perspective suggests that 
GHG reduction is more costly than the technologists argue, and it puts relatively more 
emphasis on market-based GHG control policies like carbon taxes or tradable carbon 
permit systems to encourage the least costly means of carbon efficiency (not necessarily 
                                                           
4 These simulation exercises are not meant to be realistic, given the recent developments in international 
climate negotiation. We use the Kyoto Protocol for our simulations because the content of that agreement 
is well understood.  6
energy efficiency) enhancement available to individual energy users. One possibility is 
to substitute polluting inputs with less polluting ones within the existing technology. An 
alternative is for firms to make deliberate choices purporting to develop new less 
polluting production methods, i.e. undertake innovation activities. In this case the 
starting point is to ask why firms would want to develop cleaner technologies 
themselves. At the basis of the “innovative” reason for R&D are two motivating forces, 
profitable investment and strategic advantage, against which to consider costs of 
carrying out R&D, including appropriability considerations. Alternative to this approach 
is the idea that the accumulation of knowledge occurs not as a result of deliberate 
(R&D) efforts, but as a side effect of conventional economic activity. This view is 
distinctive of LbD and of the technologist approach. 
In terms of environmental modeling, the bottom-up approach has mostly 
appealed to the notion of Learning by Doing (LbD henceforth), while a few top-down 
models have entertained the notion of a stock of knowledge which accumulates over 
time via R&D spending. 
A number of bottom-up models have integrated endogenous technological 
change that assumes LbD. Examples are MESSAGE (Messner, 1995, 1997) and 
MARKAL (Barreto and Kypreos, 1999), dynamic linear programming models of the 
energy sector that are generally used in tandem with the MACRO macro-economic 
model which provides economic data for the energy sector (Manne, 1981; see also 
Seebregts, Kram, Schaeffer, Stoffer, Kypreos, Barreto, Messner, and Schrattenholzer, 
1999; Manne and Barreto, 2001). They optimize a choice between different 
technologies using given abatement costs and carbon emission targets. These models 
feature a learning or experience curve describing technological progress as a function of 
accumulating experience with production (LbD for manufacturers) and with use 
(learning-by-using – LbU – for consumers) of a technology during its diffusion. 
Technological learning has been observed historically for many different industries and 
is a well-established concept. 
In general, the inclusion of endogenous technical change leads to earlier 
investment in energy technologies, a different mix of technologies and a lower level of 
overall discounted investment, as compared to exogenous technical change. When 
examining the optimal timing of CO2 abatement (Grubler and Messner, 1998) via a set 
of given concentration stabilization targets, an optimal trajectory with lower emissions  7
in the near term is found with endogenous technical change. The differences are, 
however, rather small relative to the exogenous case. 
Recent developments have considered two-factor learning functions in which 
there is a separate effect, besides cumulative capacity, of R&D expenditures on the 
costs of specific energy technologies. Preliminary results do not support this addition, 
termed “Learning by Searching”: in four of the eight technologies considered 
cumulative R&D expenditures increased rather than decreasing investment costs 
(Criqui, Klaassen, and Schrattenholzer, 2000) (see also Miketa and Schrattenholzer, 
2002). 
In terms of top-down modelling, the focus has been more on R&D induced 
technical change  than on LbD. The RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) has been 
used by Nordhaus (2002) to lay out a model of induced innovation brought about by 
R&D efforts. In particular, technological change displays its effects through changes in 
the emissions-output ratio. This aspect was actually  embedded in the non-regional 
version of the author’s RICE model for climate change policy analysis, called DICE 
(Nordhaus, 1993). 
  Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo, and Galeotti (2000, 2001) and Buonanno, 
Carraro, and Galeotti (2001) extend the RICE model by endogenizing both 
environmental and non-environmental technical change and by allowing for trading of 
emission permits. In the model, called ETC-RICE, each country plays a non-
cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting, which yields an Open Loop Nash 
equilibrium. It is assumed that innovation is brought about by R&D spending which 
contributes to the accumulation of knowledge. The stock of existing knowledge is a 
factor of production, which therefore enhances the rate of productivity. This is a form of 
endogenous technical change. Besides this channel, however, knowledge also serves the 
purpose of reducing, ceteris paribus, the level of carbon emissions. This is referred to in 
the literature as induced technical change. The authors compare the costs of complying 
with the CO2 targets agreed upon in Kyoto with and without induced technical change. 
The authors analyse this issue under several policy options, that is when emission trade 
is not allowed, is restricted to (all) Annex B countries only and, finally, is extended to 
all world countries. Finally, Buchner, Carraro, and Cersosimo (2001) employ the ETC-
RICE model to assess the consequences of the “new” Bonn/Marrakech agreements on 
permit prices and quantities exchanged, domestic abatement, R&D activity and 
emissions.  8
A very recent model, called DEMETER, which incorporates endogenous 
technical change, is proposed by van der Zwaan, Gerlagh, Klaassen, and 
Schrattenholzer (2002) (see also Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2000). A macroeconomic 
(top-down) model is specified that distinguishes between two different energy 
technologies, carbon and carbon-free. The costs of the latter are dependent upon the 
cumulative capacity installed. Thus the model is expanded with learning curves 
previously used in energy systems (bottom-up) models. The model is a global one, not 
therefore designed to address issues such as emission trading. The authors compare 
several scenarios with taxes on the carbon and subsidies on the non-carbon technology. 
During the first decades, they find that carbon taxes reduce energy consumption. At a 
later stage, however, when the greenhouse gas policies have enhanced the maturing of 
the carbon-free technology, energy prices decrease and energy consumption reaches 
values higher than under business-as-usual. Moreover, overall consumption decreases in 
the first decades, with respect to business-as-usual, because of transition costs, while the 
availability of a progressively cheaper non-carbon technology increases total 
consumption in later periods. 
Besides Nordhaus’ RICE, the other probably most popular climate model is 
Manne and Richels (1992)’ MERGE model. Like RICE, MERGE is an intertemporal 
general equilibrium model in which each of the model’s regions maximizes the 
discounted utility of its consumption subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Each 
region’s wealth includes not only capital, labor, and exhaustible resources, but also its 
negotiated international share in emission rights. Moreover, in addition to international 
trade in emission rights, it allows for trade in oil, gas, and energy-intensive goods. The 
model divides the world into nine geopolitical regions. A distinguishing feature of the 
model is that it combines a top-down perspective on the remainder of the economy 
together with a bottom-up representation of the energy supply sector. A distinction is 
made between electric and non-electric energy. There are several alternative sources of 
electricity supply, some of them being in operation in the base year (2000), others due 
to be available later on. In a very recent version of the model (Manne and Richels, 
2002), one of the previous two electric backstop technologies, the low-cost one, is 
replaced by a LbD process. Its total costs are initially identical to those of the high-cost 
backstop, but its learning costs decline by 20% for every doubling of cumulative 
experience. The authors examine the impact of LbD on the timing and costs of emission  9
abatement under both a concentration and an emission target. On the whole, they do not 
find a big impact of LbD relative to previous analyses without that possibility. 
Finally, it is to be mentioned the model of knowledge accumulation of Goulder 
and Mathai (2000), in which a central planner chooses time paths of abatement and 
R&D efforts in order to minimise the present value of the costs of abating emissions and 
of R&D expenditures subject to an emission target. The abatement cost function 
depends both on abatement and on the stock of knowledge that increases over time via 
R&D investment. By assuming a central planner this model sidesteps the problem of 
explicitly modelling innovation incentives and appropriability. A second problem 
studied by the authors assumes that the rate of change of the knowledge stock is 
governed by abatement efforts themselves. This form of technological change is termed 
LbD.  
This model is one of the few examples, if not the only one so far, that 
accommodates both forms of endogenous technical change. Its economic structure is 
however quite simplified as it is a constrained cost minimization problem with no 
concern for economic growth and welfare and for policies other than abatement and 
R&D. The model proposed here entertains instead both R&D-based and LbD modes of 
technical change in a single sector optimal economic growth setup. It is to this model 
that we now turn. 
 
 
3.  Model Description 
In our extension of the RICE model, technical change is no longer exogenous. In 
particular, we assume that there exists an endogenously generated stock of knowledge 
which affects both factor productivity and the emission-output ratio. The main feature 
of this paper concerns the way knowledge accumulates. Following Romer (1996), on 
the one hand, and Goulder and Mathai (2000), on the other, we explore the two 
principal theoretical options, i.e. we first relate knowledge to R&D investments, and 
then we allow knowledge to be generated through LbD. In the former  case, knowledge 
is the result of intertemporal optimal accumulation of R&D, where R&D is a new 
choice variable. In the LbD, we quite simply assume that knowledge is approximated by 
installed capacity. In our model, installed capacity is represented by physical capital, 
which cumulates through periodic investment. Thus, the LbD approach entails one less  10
choice variable with respect to the R&D approach, but no further claim on resources 
created is made, in addition to consumption and physical investment. Our purpose is to 
compare the outcomes of some simulations, in order to verify the robustness of the 
results to the implementation of the above defined two different approaches. 
 
3.1 The Model with No Induced Technical Change 
As a starting point we consider the specification of the model which only allows 
for endogenous technical change, i.e. the case in which knowledge affects only factor 
productivity. In the case innovation is brought about by R&D spending, it is assumed 
that the stock of knowledge is a factor of production, which enters a country production 
technology along with physical capital and labor.
5 Knowledge therefore enhances the 
rate of productivity (see Griliches, 1979 and 1984).  Hence, the RICE production 
function is modified as follows: 
 
() ()() () () []
γ γ β − =
1 , , , , , t n K t n L t n K t n A t n Q F R
n
R
             (1a) 
 
where Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of 
technology and KR, L and KF are respectively the inputs from knowledge capital, labor 
and physical capital (n and t index time and country respectively). The stock of 
knowledge accumulates as follows: 
 
( ) () ( )() t n K t n D R t n K R R R , 1 , & 1 , δ − + = +                  (2) 
 
where  R&D  are expenditures in Research and Development and δR  is the rate of 
knowledge depreciation. Finally, R&D spending is included in the fundamental identity 
of sources and uses: 
 
() ()() () t n D R t n I t n C t n Y , & , , , + + =                (3a) 
 
                                                           
5 We do not dispute the fact that this technological specification is quite restrictive, mainly for the lack of 
energy inputs, and therefore not very suited for climate change policy analysis. Our purpose has not 
clearly been that of modifying the basic structure of the RICE model.   11
where C is consumption, I gross fixed capital formation and Y is output net of climate 
change effects, in accordance with the following expression: 
 
() () () t n Q t n t n Y , , , Ω =                      (4) 
 
with Ω being an output scaling factor capturing emissions controls and to damages from 
climate change. 
In the case of Learning by Doing equation (1a) has to be modified in a manner 
that enables a rise in productivity due to physical capital (installed capacity), without 
the contribution of KR in the production function. It is possible to formalise this idea by 
simply modifying the Cobb-Douglas coefficients, so that returns to scale result to be 
increasing, given the augmented capital-output elasticity. Thus,  equation (1a) is 
modified as follows: 
 
() () () () [] () () () [ ]
L L
t n K t n L t n A K t n K t n L t n A t n Q F F F
β γ γ β γ γ + − − = = , , , , , , ,
1 1       (1b) 
 
where β
L can be referred to as the learning-by-doing coefficient. 
 
With LbD equation (2) is missing in this version of the model and equation (3a) 
reverts back to its original formulation in the RICE model: 
 
() ()() t n I t n C t n Y , , , + =                    (3b) 
 
This implies that, under the LBD approach, knowledge creation does not place any 
claim on resources, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.2 Accounting for Induced Technical Change 
  As said above, besides affecting factor productivity, knowledge influences also 
the emissions-output ratio. This is referred to as induced technical change. Following 
the R&D approach, it is assumed that the stock of knowledge, besides being a factor of 
production, also serves the purpose of reducing, ceteris paribus, the level of carbon 
emissions. Thus, R&D efforts prompt both environmental and non-environmental  12
technical progress. More precisely, consider the RICE emissions-output relationship, 
whose original version is as follows: 
 
  () () [] () () , , , , 1 , t n Q t n t n t n E σ µ − =    () 1 , 0 ≤ ≤ t n µ             (5) 
 
where µ is the domestic abatement rate and σ is the exogenously given emissions-output 
ratio.
6 Accounting for induced technical change, (5) is modified as follows: 
 








n α  is the region-specific elasticity through which knowledge reduces the 
emission-output ratio, 
R
n χ  is a scaling coefficient, and σn is the value to which the 
emission-output ratio tends asymptotically as the stock of knowledge increases without 
limit. In this formulation, R&D contributes to output productivity on the one hand, and 
affects the emissions-output ratio, and therefore the overall level of pollution emissions, 
on the other hand.
7 
  With a LbD-based knowledge accumulation, equation (5a) is simply replaced by 
the following: 
 




n n , , 1   , exp , µ α χ σ − − + =            (5b) 
 
where we substitute knowledge capital with physical capital. Hence, physical capital 
covers the role that knowledge capital has in the R&D approach, i.e. KF contributes to 
output productivity on the one hand, and affects the emissions-output ratio, and 
therefore the overall level of pollution emissions, on the other hand.
8 
                                                           
6 Notice that along the paper we will use the expression ‘emissions-output ratio’ as to indicate the time-
varying, idiosyncratic coefficient σ(n,t). In fact, as equation (5) suggests, σ(n,t) is a conditional (by-
product of the) emissions-output ratio, the domestic-abatement rate µ(n,t) being the conditioning variable. 
We so consider as synonymous the terms ‘emissions-output ratio’ and ‘sigma’. 
7 We are well aware of the fact that introducing a single type of R&D investment that serves two purposes 
is unsatisfactory. However, besides the difficulty of finding suitable data for environmental and non-
environmental R&D for six world regions, the most relevant problem is that in the BAU case, when no 
constraint on emissions is present, there is no incentive in undertaking positive rates of environmental 
R&D. 
8 Hence, also with the Learning by Doing formulation, we do not distinguish between possible different 
sources of knowledge formation (say, non-environmental sources and environmental ones). In doing so,  13
 
3.3 Accounting for Emission Trading 
As stated in the Introduction, the goal of this paper is to assess the implications 
of the two alternative specifications concerning knowledge accumulation proposed 
above. Therefore, the two versions of the ETC-RICE model are used to quantify some 
resource allocation effects under different assumptions on the use of the so-called 
“flexibility mechanisms”. Despite the last indications about the fate of the Kyoto 
Protocol, we chose to explore some scenarios which nowadays may appear 
counterfactual. In particular, we would like to compare the Business As Usual (BAU) 
scenario with a case in which emission trading is not allowed (‘Kyoto’ scenario) and 
one in which trading takes place amongst all the Annex B countries, including the US 
(‘ET-A1’ case). This reason for this choice is twofold. First, the purpose of this paper is 
not that of assessing the immediate economic effects of complying with Kyoto. It is 
instead that of analyzing the consequences of different feasible environmental policies, 
in order to compare the outcomes stemming from two theoretically different 
approaches. Second, the time horizon considered is rather long (2000-2050), implying 
that recent political decisions, like the US withdrawal from the Kyoto agreement, are 
not likely to remain unchanged for such a long period. 
Going back to the model specification, when considering emission trading, two 
additional equations have to be included. The first one accounts for the new burden that 
emissions permits represent in the fundamental sources and uses identity. Hence, 
equations (3a) and (3b) have to be respectively replaced by the following:  
 
() ()() () ( ) () t n NIP t p t n D R t n I t n C t n Y , , & , , , + + + =            (6a) 
 
() ()() ( ) () t n NIP t p t n I t n C t n Y , , , , + + =                (6b) 
 
In addition, equation (7) states that the Kyoto limits can be relaxed in the case of 
emission trading: 
 
() ( ) () t n NIP n Kyoto t n E , , + ≤                     (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
we draw a symmetry between the R&D-driven Knowledge case and the LbD-driven one in order to 
perform sensible comparisons between these two frameworks.  14
 
The variable NIP represents the net demand for permits, while Kyoto is the emission 
target set in the Kyoto Protocol for each one of the signatory countries and the BAU 
levels for the non-signatory ones. According to (6a) and (6b), resources produced by the 
economy must be devoted, in addition to consumption, investment and, in (6a), research 
and development, to net purchases of emission permits. Equation (7) states that a 
region’s emissions may exceed the limit set in Kyoto if permits are bought, and vice 
versa in the case of sales of permits. Note that p(t) is the price of a unit of tradable 
emission permits expressed in terms of the numeraire output price. Moreover, there is 
an additional policy variable to be considered in this case, which is net demand for 
permits NIP. 
Under the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby a Nash 
equilibrium is reached can be described as follows. Each region maximises its utility 
subject to the individual resource and capital constraints, now including the Kyoto 
constraint, and the climate module for a given emission (i.e. abatement) strategy of all 
the other players and a given price of permits p(t) (in the first round this is set at an 
arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal choices, the overall net 
demand for permits is computed at that given price. If the sum of net demands in each 
period is approximately zero, a Nash equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the price is 
revised as a function of the market disequilibrium and each region’s decision process 
starts again. 
 
3.4 Parameter Calibration 
As for parameter calibration and data requirements for the newly introduced 
variables, we proceed as follows. Firstly, coefficients already present in the original 
RICE 96 model are left unchanged. Next, when the R&D driven stock of knowledge is 
considered as an input of the production function (see equation (1a)), for each region we 
calibrate the coefficient 
R
n β  so as to obtain in the year 2000 a value of the R&D-output 
ratio equal to the 1990 one. R&D figures for 1990 are taken from Coe and Helpman 
(1995), while the 1990 stock of knowledge for the U.S.A., Japan, and Europe comes 
from Helpman’s Web page.
9 For the remaining three macro-regions 1990 values of the 
knowledge stock are constructed by taking the average ratio between knowledge and 
                                                           
9 Helpman’s Web page is at the URL http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/helpman/data.html.  15
physical capital of the three industrialised regions and multiplying it by the 1990 
physical capital stock of the other regions as given in the RICE model. The regional 
parameters 
R
n α  and 
R
n χ  in equation (5a) are OLS estimated using time series of the 
emissions-output ratio and of the stock of knowledge (the sample runs from years 1990 
to 2120, i.e. it consists of ten years of data). The data for the former variable are those 
used by Nordhaus and Yang (1996), while those for the latter variable are recovered 
from a BAU simulation conducted using the original emissions-output ratio σ(n,t) of the 
RICE 96 model.
10 The asymptotic values σn are computed by simulating the pattern of 
the exogenous emissions-output ratio in the original Nordhaus and Yang (1996)’s RICE 
model for 1,000 periods: the values of the last period are then taken as asymptotes. 
Finally, the rate of knowledge depreciation is set at 5%, following a suggestion 
contained in Griliches (1979). 
Instead, when learning-by-doing is the source of experience in the model we do 
not calibrate the capital-output elasticity β. Actually, in this case we arbitrarily set the 
value of this elasticity to be equal to 1/10 of the capital-output elasticity as in Nordhaus 
and Yang (1996)’ s RICE model. Technically speaking, we do so because of the 
impossibility of replicating the original Business As Usual scenario without setting that 
elasticity equal to zero. Hence, in this way we are basically augmenting the physical 
capital productivity in order to mimic the LbD effect. Given the high level of 
arbitrariness involved in this operation, we perform a sensitivity test, by admitting in a 
second stage of our analysis a larger LbD coefficient, which is now set to be equal to 
3/10 of the original capital-output elasticity. We will see how the results change when 
this second coefficient value is taken into account. Once imposed the value β to the 
elasticity parameter, we simulate a BAU scenario with exogenous emissions-output 
ratio, in order to collect the time-series for the physical capital. Then we OLS estimate 
the parameters 
L
n α  and 
L
n χ  in equation (5b) using the same time series of the emissions-
output ratio as in the former OLS regressions, while replacing the stock of knowledge 
with the stock of physical capital (the sample still runs from years 1990 to 2120). Table 
1 collects all the new coefficients and initial values introduced in the RICE96 model. 
 
 
                                                           
10 More specifically, for each region we regress ln[σ(n,t)-σn] against an intercept and –KR(n,t). The 
antilog of the intercept provides an estimate of χn, while the slope coefficient produces an estimate of αn.  16
 
Table 1: Coefficients of the ETC-RICE Model 
  R
n α  
R
n χ  
L
n α  
L
n χ   σn  R
n β  
L
low β  
L
high β   δR,K KR(n,1990)
USA  0.195440 0.019369 0.042667 0.023259 0.00971 0.04355 0.025 0.075 0.05 1.24200 
Japan  0.522430 0.005270 0.122960 0.008230 0.00600 0.04550 0.025 0.075 0.05 0.27773 
Europe 0.296490 0.007659 0.045242 0.009928 0.00699 0.03180 0.025 0.075 0.05 0.75526 
China  0.618650 0.112771 0.024206 0.110836 0.00904 0.01080 0.025 0.075 0.05 0.03145 
FSU  1.197400 0.095579 0.080718 0.095531 0.00935 0.01660 0.025 0.075 0.05 0.07269 
ROW  0.072926 0.022409 0.002510 0.022241 0.00845 0.00927 0.025 0.075 0.05 0.39343 
Note: The stock of knowledge is expressed in trillions of 1990 US dollars. 
 
 
4. Endogenous Induced Technical Change: Optimal Reaction to Different 
Environmental Policies 
In order to quantify the effects of introducing induced technical change first via 
R&D and then via LbD, some resource allocation choices in different environmental 
policy scenarios, coherent with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, are 
considered. As stated above, the impact of imposing an emission target without 
allowing for trade is studied. Then, emission trading is considered, with exchange 
taking place amongst Annex B countries (Et-A1). For each optimization run, time paths 
of the following control variables (abatement, fixed investment, R&D expenditures, net 
demand for permits) are obtained and their impacts on the endogenous variables 
(emissions, GNP, consumption, and so on) over the period 2000-2050 (the well-known 
“Kyoto forever” scenario) computed. In what follows, we will focus mainly on the 
following control variables: consumption, fixed investment, domestic abatement and 
R&D expenditures. In our analysis we refer to ‘average differences’, the differences 
being computed by considering the optimal values assumed by the variables of interest 
in the ‘Kyoto’ and ‘Et-A1’ scenarios, and by subtracting to those values the figures 
recorded under the Business-As-Usual hypothesis. In particular, in our analysis we care 
about control variables such as consumption of the numeraire good, physical capital, 
domestic abatement rate, and (where present) R&D expenditures. For ease of 
presentation we only display average figures over the simulation period 2010-2050. 
Moreover, we restrict our investigations to Annex B countries, assembled as in the  17
original RICE Model, leaving out countries that do not have any commitment in the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
 
4.1 R&D-based Technological Change 
  As stated above, in our extension of the model technical change is no longer 
exogenous: knowledge is endogenously generated and affects factor productivity (ETC 
– Endogenous Technical Change) or both factor productivity and the emission-output 
ratio (ITC – Induced Technical Change). As to better appreciate the different stimuli on 
the control variables that the two specifications generate, in our graphs exogenous and 
endogenous sigma cases (i.e. ETC and ITC) are always jointly presented.  
  Consider first the case in which the environmental technology evolves 
exogenously. Starting from the BAU scenario, the imposition of an emission ceiling 
turns out being a ceiling on production, via equations (1a), (4), and (5). This leads all 
Annex B countries to experience a welfare loss, since the average level of consumption 
unambiguously decreases, as shown in Figure 1. This is due to the reduction of physical 
capital stock by about 2-3% relative to the BAU scenario, as Figure 2 suggests. 
Domestic abatement rates are inevitably enhanced when constraints on emissions are 
imposed, as evident in Figure 3. Notice that, in this framework, R&D expenditures 
exerts a positive effect uniquely on the inputs’ productivity. Hence, it is not surprising 
to observe a lower average level of R&D expenditures after the imposition of the 
emissions’ caps (Figure 4, top panel).  
Indeed, there seem to be some important deviations when allowing for the 
endogenous environmental technical change to be part of our analysis. In fact, in this 
latter case agents find profitable to raise their R&D expenditures when upper bounds on 
emissions are activated (Figure 4, bottom panel); they do so in order to improve their 
environmental technology, so being allowed to grow more (i.e. to reduce capital 
accumulation less than in the exogenous environmental technological change case after 
the imposition of the Kyoto constraints) and finally to consume more (Figures 1 and 2). 
Not surprisingly, given the positive influence of the stock of R&D-driven Knowledge 
on the environmental technology, agents’ R&D expenditures turn out being 
complementary to the domestic abatement action, while when the environmental 
technology is exogenous they are substitutes (due to the fact that R&D expenditures 
raise production and, as a by product, pollution). To summarize, when agents can shape  18
their emissions-output ratio, they are able to exploit this additional possibility to 
increase their welfare. 
When emission trading between Annex B countries is permitted, all the regions 
are better off. This is hardly surprising, given that we each region is endowed with an 
extra degree of freedom, i.e. the possibility to trading rights to pollute. Figure 1 
confirms this fact.  
It is interesting to understand where these welfare-gains derive from. In fact, not all the 
consumption’s variation stems from an augmented production (caused by an increased 
average stock of capital). Indeed, the effects on the average variation of capital cannot 
be predicted a priori. Investment choices depend crucially on the role each country will 
have in the market: depending on the equilibrium price of emission permits, 
endogenously generated by the model, and on the basis of other information such as the 
domestic abatement cost, each country decides whether to act as a permits seller or 
buyer. In particular, in a very simplified view, a region will choose to be a seller when 
the marginal earnings from the emission permits market are higher than the marginal 
expenses needed in order to lower the emissions to the optimal point under the Kyoto 
ceiling. These expenses can be both direct (abatement costs) and indirect (less 
production, via lower average growth rate of capital, or more R&D). The opposite holds 
for buyers, i.e. costs for permits are lower than expenses to reduce emissions under 
Kyoto targets. 
  The considerations just made can explain why the Former Soviet Union (seller) 
reduces the optimal stock of capital more under trading, while USA, EU, and Japan 
(buyers) reduce it less (Figure 2). This is possible given the ‘relaxation’ of the 
constraints on emissions they enjoy when they purchase a positive amount of permits. 
This brings buyers to lower the emission control rate, since they may acquire on the 
market what they were previously obliged to obtain through domestic action. On the 
contrary, FSU (the unique seller) uses abatement and R&D expenditures as strategic 
variables; i.e., this country strongly raises them, in order to create a high number of 
emission permits to be conveniently sold on the market. 
  When the emission-output ratio is endogenous, the differences existing in the 
regions’ optimal behaviours when moving from Kyoto to Et-A1 are qualitatively in line 
with what already observed. Quantitatively, the possibility of influencing the emissions-
output ratio is welfare enhancing (this is true for all the regions, and in particular for  19
FSU). All the changes noted in the previous paragraph and regarding physical capital, 
domestic abatement rate, and R&D expenditures appear to be of smaller magnitudes.  
 
4.2 LbD-based Technological Change 
  Compared to the ‘Learning by Researching’ approach, the LbD version of the 
model presents one less choice variable, i.e. the control variables are now limited to 
consumption, domestic abatement, fixed investment and net demand for permits, since 
fixed capital replaces R&D expenditures in the role of accumulating knowledge. Hence, 
physical capital now plays the same role that knowledge capital had in the R&D 
approach. Notice that this fact has some implications. On the one hand, the physical 
capital’s marginal returns are higher, so for a given amount of capital the overall 
production is now higher.
11 This induces optimising agents to invest quite a lot of 
resources in physical capital, in order to fully exploit its increased marginal 
productivity. In this set up there is not any distinction between the input per se (physical 
capital) and the element which enhances its productivity (Knowledge). So, it is not 
possible to substitute welfare today (i.e. less consumption) with higher productivity of 
the input tomorrow (i.e. more Knowledge given the same amount of capital). Instead, 
this is possible in the R&D-driven Knowledge case. In our opinion, this distinction is 
important. In fact, it is true that R&D is a costly avenue to improve the stock of 
Knowledge. However, it is also a different aggregate with respect to capital, so – at least 
in our analysis - it allows a more free management of the available resources with 
respect to the LbD case. If the case of environmental technical change is endogenous, 
agents have to modify their amount of physical capital in order to improve the 
emissions-output ratio. This does not happen in the R&D case. Roughly put, in our set 
up LbD causes Knowledge growth for free, but agents are a bit more constrained in their 
choices with respect to the R&D-driven Knowledge case. These considerations will be 
of help in interpreting the results we obtained. 
 
                                                           
11 There is an important assumption behind our way of accounting for LbD. When determining the 
optimal amount of resources to be invested in physical capital, agents are perfectly aware of the ‘learning 
effect’ triggered by capital accumulation. Hence, they fully understand that the marginal productivity of 






























Recall that, under our formulation of the LbD technological evolution, the elasticity of 
physical capital is augmented in a manner that induces increasing returns to scale of the 
inputs in the production function. Since the value of what we called ‘learning-by-doing 
coefficient’ (β
L) is arbitrarily chosen, we run the model using two different values, 
β
L=0.025 and β
L=0.075. In this way we assess the sensitivity of results. Relative to the 
previous approach the results present some significant differences. 
Let us consider the case of exogenous sigma. We start our analysis with the case 
in which the LbD effect is lower (i.e. β
L = 0.025). The imposition of an emission 
ceiling, without the possibility of trading emission permits, turns out being a ceiling on 
production, so a ceiling on fixed capital, which leads to a decrease in consumption, as 
depicted in Figure 5. Indeed, the reduction in physical capital seems to be slightly 
bigger than in the R&D-driven case (compare Figures 2 and 6). This is justified by the 
fact that, in the BAU scenario, agents are not emissions-constrained, so decide to 
accumulate quite a lot of capital. When the Kyoto limits become part of the framework, 
the reduction of the physical capital has to be such that, even considering the high 
productivity of capital, the pollution stemming from the production activity does not 
exceed the environmental constraints; hence, the reduction is quantitatively important. 
Not surprisingly, agents abate domestically in order to comply with Kyoto; the increase 
in the domestic efforts is larger with the LbD hypothesis (compare Figures 3 and 7).  
How do things change when the environmental technical change is allowed for? 
Indeed, the welfare reduction is milder in this latter case. Indeed, with a low value of β
L 
the fact that the environmental technology is driven by the stock of physical capital does 
not seem to be too problematic. Notice the striking difference that exists between the 
physical capital variations registered under exogenous vs. endogenous environmental 
technology. In the latter case, agents in general augment the amount of resources 
allocated to physical capital, because in this way they are both much more productive 
and environmentally efficient (i.e. a given amount of output causes the emissions of a 
small flow of emissions). De facto, this is the situation in which the agents are able to 
exploit all the large returns that can come from the LbD-driven Knowledge, so there is a 
strong incentive to keep investing in physical capital. As far as the domestic abatement 
rate is concerned, we do not notice remarkable differences with respect to the case with 
exogenous sigma.  
When allowing for the emissions trading, what we observe is that the regions 
acting as purchasers on the permits market (i.e. USA, Japan, and Europe) slightly  25
augment their capital accumulation, whilst the seller (namely, FSU) experiences a 
further reduction as far as this variable is concerned, since it finds it profitable to reduce 
emissions in order to enjoy the gains from trade stemming from the emissions market. 
Consistently, the purchasers reduce their domestic abatement efforts, whilst the sellers 
increase them optimally.  
When considering a much higher Knowledge-output elasticity (i.e. β
L = 0.075), 
results turn out being qualitatively in line with those already presented (compare 
Figures 5-7 with Figures 8-10). The only exception is represented by the variation of 
physical capital in presence of environmental constraints. In case of endogenous 
emission-output ratio, what it turns out is that USA and FSU behave as we have 
commented above (i.e. with positive variations), while JPN and EU reduce their stocks. 
Why so? This apparently surprising result may be explained by focusing on both the 
large productivity of the physical capital and the environmental efficiency featuring 
these two regions. In fact, given that they are two high-tech countries from an 
environmental viewpoint, when having to tackle the Kyoto limits they should increase 
their Knowledge quite a lot in order to reduce their emissions-output ratio. Given the 
framework at hand, for them this would imply the need of augmenting quite a lot the 
stock of capital, whose returns are very high, i.e. the production level coming from the 
newly accumulated stock of capital would be very large. But this would bring to a high 
level of pollution, incompatible with the Kyoto constraints. That is why, given our 
structure of the economy, it is optimal for environmentally advanced countries to reduce 
their amount of capital, in order to maximize the overall returns coming from capital. 
Instead, USA and FSU, whose environmental technology is low, face low marginal cost 
of abatement, and it is much easier for them to grow via capital accumulation so 











































4.3 A Comparison between the Two Approaches 
Goulder and Mathai (2000) explore the importance of policy induced 
technological change for the design of carbon abatement policies. By comparing R&D-
based and LbD-based knowledge accumulation, they verify that the impact of induced 
technical change on the optimal abatement path varies. In particular, when knowledge is 
gained through R&D investments, the presence of immediately improving technology 
justifies a delay in abatement efforts, while when LbD is the source of knowledge the 
impact on the timing of abatement turns out being ambiguous. Notice that in their work 
a social planner has to face a constraint on carbon concentration (i.e. cumulated 
emissions), while in ours six different regions play a Nash-game taking into account 
caps on emissions. Goulder and Mathai (2000)’s and our framework are so deeply 
different, so rendering very difficult a direct comparison on the results. That is why, in 
drawing a comparison between R&D and LbD, we prefer to focus our attention on the 
variables we have focused our attention on so far, i.e. consumption, physical capital, 
and domestic abatement rate. 
First of all, what we want to emphasize is that R&D and LbD are two 
conceptually different sources of Knowledge. Indeed, the first one is costly, but it 
endows firms with a control variable more (R&D expenditures), so rendering their 
problem more ‘flexible’. Vice versa, Knowledge stemming from LbD is for free ceteris 
paribus, but firms do not have any specific control variable to manage it.  
Nevertheless, our findings regarding the imposition of emissions constraints 
(with or without flexibility mechanism) are qualitatively speaking quite similar. In fact, 
it turns out that limits on emissions are welfare depressing, because they bring to clear 
reduction in the consumption enjoyed by the agents. Moreover, apart from some 
exception (USA and FSU), that imposition leads to a reduction in the stock of physical 
capital, and a logical increase of the domestic effort aimed at an environmental 
improvement. As expected, the flexibility mechanism (i.e. emissions trading) renders 
less costly to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. 
Quantitatively speaking, some differences are worth to be underlined. First of 
all, the welfare losses seem to be more marked under LbD, both in the case of 
exogenous technical change and in the case with endogenous sigma. The intuition for 
this result is the following: when having to face the environmental constraints, under the 
R&D-driven hypothesis agents vary (also) the R&D expenditures levels in order to 
comply with Kyoto. This means that the (negative) impact of the environmental limits is  33
optimally ‘distributed’ by the agents both on physical capital and on Knowledge, which 
have in this case different elasticities with respect to output. Instead, in the LbD-driven 
Knowledge framework, Kyoto’s implications in terms of reduced production affect 
uniquely physical capital; in other words, agents have a degree of freedom less, so it is 
not surprising that they obtain an inferior result in terms of welfare. 
The key role of physical capital is confirmed by the fact that with exogenous 
emission-output ratio the reduction of the accumulated fixed investments are less 
pronounced under R&D; this is so because of the impossibility of improving the 
environmental technology by augmenting the stock of Knowledge. Instead, when the 
emissions-output ratio is endogenous, capital plays the role of R&D, i.e. its reduction is 
less pronounced with respect to the R&D-driven Knowledge case because it causes the 
improvement of the environmental technology.  
The fruitful interactions between R&D and domestic abatement rate implies that 
the latter is lower when agents may exploit the former; in other words, in presence of 
R&D agents undertake less domestic efforts with respect to the LbD case, in which of 
course those interactions are just not possible. 
All what we have written above holds also in case of emissions trading, which so 
renders less costly the compliance of the Kyoto protocol, without affecting that much 
the relative importance of the agents’ control variables. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
  Current modeling practices in the climate change literature are intensifying 
efforts at endogenizing the process of technological change. The bottom-up tradition has 
typically considered the notion of Learning by Doing, incorporated through learning 
curves associated with each technology considered. Top-down models have instead 
experimented more with R&D-based knowledge formation processes meant to capture 
the idea of an endogenously evolving technology. While there are a few recent attempts 
to allow for a role of R&D in learning process specified by bottom-up models and to 
accommodate Learning by Doing in top-down models, it appears that no model has yet 
studied both formulations using the same conceptual framework. 
  In this paper we have extended Nordhaus and Yang’s RICE model to allow for, 
besides emission trading, endogenous technical change. A crucial role is given to the 
stock of knowledge which accumulates either through deliberate, optimally selected,  34
R&D activities, or through physical investment. In the latter case the stock of 
knowledge becomes equivalent to cumulative installed capacity. The model presented 
here, called ETC-RICE, specifies endogenous technical change (enhancing output 
production) together with or without induced technical change (reducing emissions-to-
output). In all cases the state of technology, both environmental and not, can also evolve 
exogenously. 
  With these two versions of the model we ran a set a basic simulations under 
alternative regimes concerning emission trading within the context of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
  Our results seem to support the conclusion that, although conceptually very 
different, R&D-driven and LbD-driven Knowledge frameworks may lead to 
qualitatively similar findings. In particular, what we find is that caps on emissions are 
welfare depressing, and the possibility to affect the environmental technology just offers 
a milder version of this depression. However, our quantitative outcomes lead us to think 
that R&D, being a costly but additional control variable exploitable by optimizing 
agents, may provide the agents with a better outcome with respect to a pure LbD 
framework, in which Knowledge accumulates for free but it may constrain agents to 
undertake optimal choices in a more ‘rigid’ set up.  
  In this paper we did not study forms of hybrid Knowledge formation, i.e. 
situations in which R&D and LbD are jointly present. We guess that a hybrid 
Knowledge formation could provide agents with a superior results, but empirical 
endeavors have to be undertaken before claiming so. 
  Naturally, much remains to be done within the research project of which the 
present paper is a further block. The next and more important task is to complete the 
transition to a more realistic model, the RICE99 model, which highlights a new 
production input, carbon energy, together with a price for it. Other aspects to allow for 
are knowledge spillovers, carbon sequestration, and climate change impacts.   35
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